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PRESERVATION OF WETLANDS:
THE CASE OF SAN FRANCISCO BAY*
RALPH A. LUKEN ° °
A new problem emerging in the field of environmental management is the control of the land-water interface or shoreline zone. 1
Public dissatisfaction arises not only from a misallocation of existing
shoreline land among several competing alternatives, such as using
vacant sites for non-water related activities and inhibiting virtually all
public access, but also from a literal transformation of a non-market
priced water resource into a land resource subject to an irrational
pattern of development.
While regulation of the shoreline zone has been a problem for
many years, the actual transformation of wetlands into fastlands has
only recently emerged as a distinct aspect of shoreline management as
a result of the corresponding increase in societal concern for the sale
of. wetlands as productive or important habitat and, as unique
ecosystems, and as a result of the accelerating demand for shoreline
frontage. 2 Wetlands in several urban or recreation areas of the United
States are being filled to create land for industrial parks, residential
developments, highways and other human uses, and to dispose of solid
"residuals." Local communities view converted wetlands as essential
for economic development. Even where public ownership of wetlands
is clear, and potential exists for establishing use priorities, a pattern of
development emerges similar to the existing chaotic allocation of
shoreline. 3 The societal rationale for allowing the conversion of
wetlands loses much of its basis, if the newly created shoreline land is
allocated to human activity which is non-water related and which
perpetuates an unaesthetic pattern of development.
Case studies of Chesapeake Bay, the Great Lakes and San
*This paper was written while the author was a Postdoctoral Fellow, The Johns Hopkins

University. I wish to thank Blair Bower and Lyle Craine for their numerous substantive
comments, and Resources for the Future for its financial support.
**Chief Water Programs Branch, Division of Program Evaluation, Environmental Protection
Agency, Washington, D.C.
1. The shoreline zone is defined as shoreline water subject to diking, dredging, and/or filling

and shoreline land within a shoreline band 1000 feet deep from the landward limit. This
definition is based on the original legislative proposal of the San Francisco Bay Conservation and
Development Commission.
2. Wetlands include swamps, marshes, and lands subject to tidal variation. Wetland
transformation or reclamation requires diking and/or filling to create diked land and fastland.
Fastlands are either those reclaimed wetlands now suitable for development or existing solid
land acceptable for settlement.
3. For example, the recent sale of state-owned wetlands in Ocean City, Maryland, permitted
the conversion of one of the most ecologically productive and diverse areas in the state into
additional land for a trailer court.
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Francisco Bay reveal that this new aspect of the shoreline management problem, wetland transformation, is occurring most extensively
in the smallest area, San Francisco Bay. Conversion of wetlands in San
Francisco Bay has reduced the size of the bay subject to reclamation
from 570 square miles to a little over 327 square miles, a reduction of
approximately 40 percent. Wetland losses in the Maryland portion of
Chesapeake Bay (517 square miles) have been only 37 square miles or
about 7.2 percent of the total. Losses ha,'e been negligible in the
Great Lakes. The total shoreline of San Francisco Bay is only 270
miles, the shoreline of Chesapeake Bay is over 4500 miles, and that of
the Great Lakes is approximately 10,000 miles.
Pressure for development of the San Francisco Bay has been
intensified by the fact that several private parties and local governments own a significant amount of the bay bottom which is the most
susceptible to reclamation (Table 1).
TABLE 1. Present Ownership Pattern
Party

Percent Ownership of Bay Bottom

Private

22%

149

23%
50%
5%
100%

156
320
55
680

Cities & Counties
State
Federal
Total

Area (sq. mi.)

The original private property owners received their land titles
between 1855 and 1909. Initially, California sold swamp lands for $1
per acre under the authority of the Arkansas Swamp Lands Grant Act.
In 1868 the California legislature created a Board of Tideland
Commissioners, which sold at auction tide and swamp lands. Other
parties, including the surveyors of San Mateo and Alameda counties,
transferred title to submerged land on the basis of questionable
authority. At the present time, private parties own over 2,000 parcels
(95,000 acres) in the bay. While most parties own a small number of
plots, three corporations have substantial holdings, 52,000 acres by
Leslie Salt Company, 20,000 acres by Ideal Cement Corporation and
3,400 acres by the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway. Thus,
these corporations have a strong interest in future management plans
for the bay. Many cities and counties received grants between 1911
and 1915 to encourage a shipping boom and in the late forties and
early fifties to promote specific activities such as airports, small boat
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harbors, commerce and industry. These local governmental units find
few incentives rewarding preservation, but readily realize that
conversion of wetland into shoreline land brings potential economic
expansion.
While the failure of one owner or one community to evaluate
shoreline development in view of ecological and regional priorities
may not be significant, the failure of many owners and communities to
compare the values of preservation and economic development may
significantly reduce the environmental quality of the bay area and the
overall net regional product or welfare. The sum of the present
reclamation efforts has resulted in diking or filling approximately 40
percent of the original bay subject to conversion, and may claim an
additional area as extensive as 200 square miles. Significant reduction
of the water resource might alter the bay's ecology, eliminate scenic
amenities, prevent some types of recreation opportunities and reduce
waste assimilation capacity. It might even modify the regional
weather pattern. The aggregation of individual decisions could
produce in the next twenty to thirty years an environment which no
one intended to create. This kind of situation is not uncommon and
has been referred to as the "tyranny of small decisions."
Recognition of the vulnerability of the bay to development and the
problem of organizing numerous entities of government for joint or
coordinated action aroused citizen concern in the mid-sixties. 4 Their
action resulted in the creation by the California legislature of the San
Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC)
in 1965 and its permanent enabling legislation in 1969. The 1969
amendments to the McAteer-Petris Act (1965) established BCDC's
powers to regulate areas subject to dredging, diking and filling in the
Bay, and to control zoning within a shoreline band 100 feet deep from
the landward limit of San Francisco Bay. BCDC's mandate limits
shoreline development to so-called "priority uses," such as ports,
marinas, airports, water related industry, parks and wildlife refuges; it
encourages the establishment of maximum feasible public access to
5
the shoreline and waters of the bay.
The argument of this paper is that BCDC's regulatory mandate is
not the only condition necessary for implementation of the master
plan for the bay. 6 The legislative mandate gives BCDC regulatory
4. For a history of the movement, see H. Gilligan, The Devil and the Deep Blue Bay (1969).
5. Cal. Gov't Code §66605 (West 1966).
6. Also, BCDC's organizational structure might not be sufficient to deal with two
institutional realities which could undermine its mandate. First, the passage of BCDC
legislation depended upon strong, broad-based political support, such as the Save San Francisco
Bay Association. These political forces may shift to other interests with the successful passage of
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powers, but it does not provide mechanisms for dealing with income
transfers resulting from regulatory decisions entirely prohibiting some
uses or assigning uses only to certain areas. For example, prohibition
of non-water related commercial and industrial activities on
reclaimed land would transfer rental gains associated with development from one set of private property owners and cities with
potentially reclaimable wetlands to other property owners and cities.
Economic gains would shift if BCDC allowed Oakland International
Airport to expand into the bay, while the expansion of San Francisco
International Airport was prevented. It is naive to assume that private
property owners and communities as well as priority users will
willingly allow this income transfer. Most likely they will attempt to
subvert BCDC legislation. They will continue to push for development of wetlands by either gaining control over the BCDC commission, or by receiving special exemptions, as the city of Emeryville has
already done, from the state legislature. The efforts of San Francisco
to commercially develop its waterfront and the efforts of private
property owners in Richardson Bay to obtain fill permits are current
examples of the pressure for development.
Another necessary condition for plan implementation is the public
support of parties influenced by BCDC decisions.7 BCDC will be
unable to implement in the long run its master plan without the
public mandate. Regulation alone is not sufficient. BCDC must
maintain the support of specific "publics," primarily those who are
adversely affected.
One strategy for insuring their support is for BCDC to take into
account, in an effective and equitable manner, the income transfers
resulting from its regulatory decisions. The remainder of this paper
will document the magnitude of economic loss generally assigned to
the most adversely affected parties, and outline several intervention
strategies for eliminating or compensating for potential income
BCDC legislation. BCDC must now depend upon public hearings and newspapers rather than
specially organized groups, and consequently, may be without a large public base to call upon in
a time of crisis. Second, a politically appointed commission decides the final resolution of bay fill
issues. The composition of the commission might shift under strong pressure to members who
would allow development. The recent trend in the Santa Clara and Marin County Boards of
Supervisors, who each appoint a member of the Commission, towards development is an
indication of the possibility of a developmentally oriented Commission. The combination of
parties with substantial financial stakes in wetland development and the inherent weakness in
BCDC's organizational structure has the potential of undermining BCDC's regulatory power.
[Mancur Olson The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and The Theory of Group (1965)
makes a similar point about the ability of small groups with a substantial stake in an issue to
prevail over the collective interest in the long run.]
7. The importance of public support for the final authorization of BCDC is stressed in an
article about BCDC by E. Schoop and J. Herten, The San FranciscoBay Plan: Combining Policy
with Police Power, 37 J. Am. Institute of Planners 6-7 (1971).
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changes. 8 Adoption of these strategies will enhance the probability of
the successful implementation of the bay plan.
MEASUREMENT OF INCOME TRANSFER

Income transfers associated with pursuing public goals through a
new mix of preservation and development primarily affect private
property owners and individual communities. Other affected parties
are the owners of commercial and industrial establishments and
individuals who might live in housing on reclaimed wetlands.
However, these latter activities are not severely affected by alternative location patterns as long as there exist other comparable options
elsewhere in the region. Alternative locations are not an all or nothing
situation as they are for a property owner or city which is deprived of
the opportunity to develop wetlands. Restrictions on reclamation
result in transferring rental income from an owner of wetland
property to an owner of fastland as development can now only occur
on the latter. Similarly, curtailing development activity in cities with
jurisdiction over wetlands will shift settlement activity and the
associated gains to cities with available fastland. Thus, regulation
involves transfers both within the private sector and within the public
sector.
The magnitude of the income transfers associated with private
property owners can be illustrated by a demand and supply diagram.
A private property owner could face D2 for his land as a potential
development site and could reasonably expect $60,000 per acre (P1 in
Figure 1.). BCDC's mandate eliminates D2 , the demand for land for
non-priority activities, and leaves the private property owner with a
value of $1000 per acre realized under D 2 associated with only
priority uses. The wetland owner loses P1 P2 BA. Assuming that
development occurs elsewhere in the region, a fastland owner could
capture that loss in rent.
The overall result is a significant loss for the private wetland owner
and a significant gain for a fastland owner.9
The actual magnitude of the gross potential loss in rent, because of
preservation or limited uses permitted, can be established by examining recent or potential transactions involving wetlands (Table II). The
8. This analysis focuses on the rents associated with the change in the mix between priority
and non-priority uses. The same devices could also be utilized to influence the mix within the
priority uses. For example, the rate of a development tax upon marine development might vary
with how closely the marina location corresponds to BCDC's plans. Or transfer payments
among the different port facilities might bribe the jurisdictions controlling the port facilities
into following BCDC recommendations.
9. The analysis of gains and losses would be more complex if it took into account the gains of
the preservationists.
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Figure 1. Demand and Supply of Wetland

Area
Emeryville
Redwood Shores
Richardson Bay

TABLE II. Potential Rental Loss
Fair Market Value
Fair Market Value
as Wetland
as Shoreline Land
$ 1,000/A
$ 75,250/A
1,200/A
48,000/A
10,000/A
120,000/A

Gross
Difference
$ 74,250/A
46,800/A
110,000/A

potential gross loss is the difference between shoreline land and
wetland market value. 10 While the value varies depending on the
projected settlement activity (highest for intense commercial, next for
10. The potential loss is stated as a gross rather than net figure because of the difficulty of
generalizing about reclamation costs. In the case of Emeryville the cost of reclamation was
minimal because the fill was free; in the case of Redwood Shore it was approximately $15,000/A
and in the case of Richardson Bay, depending on the type of commercial activity, might vary
from $15,000 to $60,000/A.
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high density residential, and lowest for medium density residential)
and reclamation cost, the gain is substantial in- all situations.
Prohibition of reclamation of wetlands will deprive these property
owners of the rental gain associated with changing human settlement
and will transfer it to other private property owners whose lands will
be developed.'1
The other parties deprived of economic rent or pecuniary gains are
those communities with potential for non-water related development
on reclaimed wetlands. Regulating this type of development shifts the
anticipated revenue associated with economic development to other
communities in the region. There are thirty communities around the
bay which could expand their settlement
area into the bay and
12
consequently increase their revenue bases.
However, determination of the magnitude of the net community
gain from expanded human activity is not a simple calculation. The
net gain depends primarily on the composition of the settlement
pattern, i.e., the combination of industrial, commerical and residential activities. Each type of development generates both additional
revenue in the form of taxes, licenses and permits, fines and penalties,
transfer payments from other agencies and current service charges
and additional costs in the form of current expenses and capital
outlays for services. The difference between increased revenue and
increased cost is the net gain and can be identified as the potential
rent flowing into a community.
A review of economic literature, both theoretical and empirical,
leaves unresolved the question of which type of activity pattern
results in a net gain and which in a net loss of revenue, or whether all
three types of activity are similar. 13 The conclusions depend upon the
initial assumptions in the studies. Nor are there any state-wide studies
of California cities which indicate the proper attribution of costs and
revenues. 14
An investigation, undertaken for this paper, of twenty-five communites surrounding the bay reveals that industrial and commercial
activities result in net gains of revenue and residential activity results
11. This statement assumes that development will occur somewhere within the region.

12. They, like private property owners, also control potentially reclaimable wetlands.
However, they will not gain additional land rental income associated with wetland conversion
because state law requires that additional revenues go to the state.
13. R. Mace, Municipal Cost-Revenue Research in the United States, (Mimeographed
Report, Institute of Government, U. of N.C., 1961).
14. There are analyses of Stockton, California, R. Mace & W. Wicher, Do Single Family
Homes Pay Their Way? A Comparative Analysis of Costs and Revenues for Public Services,
(Research Monograph 15, Urban Land Institute, 1968); and San Leandro, California, P. Lund,
Municipal Costs Arising from Business and Industry: A Case Study of San Leandro, California
(Unpublished, University of California, Berkeley, 1967).
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in net losses for most communities. 15 Tables III, IV, and V illustrate
this point for the fiscal year 1965-1966.16
TABLE 111. Revenue Derived by Type of Activity for
the City of Albany- 1956-66
Revenue
Property Tax
General

Industrial
$ 18,600
11,600

Commercial
$ 65,200
25,800
217,800

32,500

Sales

-----

Parks & Recreation

-

312,800

2,200
8,000
1,513,400

-

School Revenue Tax

40,200
$102,900

$507,100

$2,468,000

TABLE IV. Costs of Providing Service By Type of Activity
Industrial
Commercial
Residential
$ 38,600
$ 86,900
$ 839,700
-22,600

Library
Parks & Recreation

School

-

57,700

Franchise & License
From other Agencies
Library

Costs
General
Health

Residential
$ 382,000
249,500

-

-

-

--

-

---

1,694,000

---

$ 38,600

35,300
112,200

$ 86,900

$2,703,800

TABLE V. Total Net Difference and Difference by Acre by Type
Sum
Industrial
Commercial
Residential
Total Difference
+$ 64,300
+$420,200
-$ 235,800
Difference/Acre
+$ 2,100
+$ 5,900
-$
300
Commercial activity on a per acre basis gains $5,900 and industrial
$2,100 and residential loses $300. If the assumptions upon which this
analysis is based hold, then a community which anticipates industrial
and commercial activities on reclaimed wetlands will actively
campaign for bay fill.
15. This conclusion depends on the following assumptions: (1) property tax assessments and
rates are uniform for all types of activities; (2) sales tax revenue is generated by commercial
activity; (3) other revenue sources can be identified with appropriate activities or assigned
equally to all types of activities; (4) equal cost per acre per type of activity for the usual city
services; and (5) only residential activity generates health, library, and school costs.
16. State of California, Annual Report of Financial Transactions Concerning Cities of
California, Fiscal Year 1965-1966 and Annual Report of Financial Transactions Concerning
School Districts of California, Fiscal Year 1965-1966.
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Two parties, individual property owners and cities, will experience
income transfers resulting from BCDC regulation. Since BCDC
legislation does not deal with the transfers within the private or
public sectors, the losers will probably continue their efforts to
subvert BCDC, because its action deprives them of significant rental
gains.
INTERVENTION STRATEGIES
In view of the significant, potential economic losses, a necessary
condition for plan implementation is elimination of the possibility of
loss and/or compensation for loss. Regulation alone is not enough.
The demands of affected interest groups must be acknowledged and
resolved, if BCDC is to achieve long run success. The remainder of
the article reviews several institutional devices for dealing with these
groups in order to insure their support or the elimination of their
opposition to the BCDC master plan.
Institutional devices for eliminating rental gains fall into four
general categories, legal, acquisition, taxation and transfer payments.
Legal devices are judicial decisions which would resolve once and for
all the validity of title claims and development rights on private
lands. Acquisition control, probably administered by BCDC, assumes
the legitimacy of title claims and compensates the loser of potential
rental gain. Taxation control under the possible direction of several
local or state agencies taxes the rental gain for the state or shares it
among several governmental parties. Transfer payment, usually
administered by a consortium of cities, either shares the developmental gain and/or rewards cities for preservation.
each category will be evaluated on the basis of
Techniques within
17
three criteria:
1. Is the technique effective for according higher priority to
"public" non-market values? Each technique should be able to
eliminate the incentive for wetland conversion, and thus insure a
closer approximation of the socially determined combination of
priority and non-priority uses.
2. Is the technique equitable? Each technique should compensate
a loser, if BCDC intervention gains a benefit for the public rather
than preventing any harm. Zoning land use does not require
compensation, because it prevents harm (negative externalities)
rather than capturing benefits for the public. However, if the land
17. The usual economic criteria for evaluating intervention strategies are neutrality and
equity. Neutrality is an irrelevant criterion in this case because the purpose of intervention is to
change resource allocation. Equity is one of the three criteria of evaluation.
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resource generates public benefits or a community provides a service,
intervention should compensate the relevant party or parties.18
3. Is the technique efficient in the sense that it minimizes public
investment, both initial capital outlay and continuing costs necessary
for achieving the BCDC plan? The shortage of funds available for
local, state and regional government and the general unwillingness of
the public to support bond issues guggest that the least cost
alternative is preferable.
The category of legal control eliminates rental gains by resolving
the legitimacy of title claims and by clearly defining the developmental rights of private property owners. 19 The laws determining sale
conditions between 1850 and 1910 did specify (1) that no submerged
lands would ever be sold and no tidelands sold until 1860; (2) limits on
geographic areas of sale; and (3) limits on the acreage sold to a private
party. 20 Numerous private sales transferred title to tidelands which
were in reality submerged land or tidelands in navigable sloughs and
legally should never have been sold by the state. A court resolution of
the legitimacy of title in favor of the state would take part of the
supply of wetlands from private ownership and eliminate any
possibility for rental gain. A legal resolution of the rights associated
with privately held wetlands might not eliminate all rental gain, but
might severely limit it. Private owners might hold their land subjects
to the rights of the state to regulate commerce, navigation and fishing.
A resolution of the trust issue in favor of BCDC would severely limit
the uses of wetlands, and thus reduce the potential rent.
Legal controls receive a good rating on the basis of the three
criteria. Legal controls are effective in eliminating rental potential,
because they either deny title (no rental gain) or curtail the number of
uses (only allow a small rental gain). Legal controls should be
equitable, because courts have consistently defended property
rights. 2 ' They should minimize public expense, because a favorable
court resolution would transfer title or development rights to the state
without cost. The reservation about using legal controls is the
possibility of an unfavorable court decision. BCDC would then have
18. For a thorough discussion of the harm-benefit doctrine, see Michelman, Property, Utility,
and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundation of "'Just Compensation Law" 80 Harv. L.
Rev. 1165-1258 (1967).
19. A more thorough review of the legal issues is available in, 1 Bay Conservation and
Development Commission, Ownership and Powers (1968). (Bay Conservation and Development
Commission, hereinafter BCDC).
20. Id. at 22, 23.
21. See, e.g., Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsipanny-Troy Hills,
40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 233 (1963); Dooley v. Town Plan and Zoning Comm. of the Town of
Fairfield, 197 A.2d 770 (Conn. 1964); and Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe and
Co., 349 Mass. 104, 206 N.E. 2d 666 (1965).
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to purchase fee simple title or development rights to achieve the
desired land use allocation, and the resultant public outlay would be
22
immense.
Acquisition controls cover a broad spectrum of techniques. First,
BCDC could acquire fee interests of privately held wetlands in
several ways. It could directly purchase the land, if property owners
were willing to sell them. Or it might use eminent domain to
implement schemes of advanced acquisition, similar to the situation
in Stockholm, 23 or excess condemnation which involves buying more
land than needed for the immediate purpose. The most radical
scheme of this nature was the English development charge scheme of
1947, where the state acquired all developmental rights and compensated the owners on a one-time basis. 24 BCDC might acquire fee
ownership in a more gradual fashion by purchasing options or by
requiring wetland owners to inform BCDC of an impending sale.
Second, BCDC could acquire less-than-fee interests by purchasing
development rights or conservation easements. 25 These place a broad
range of restrictions on the rights associated with development.
Evaluation of acquisition controls on the basis of the three criteria
results in a mixed verdict. By their very nature acquisition controls
are effective in capturing the potential rental gain. Purchase of fee
interests or less-than-fee interests will transfer control of the rental
gain from the private owner to the state. However, the equity of
acquisition, which depends on the purchase price, will be difficult to
establish in this situation. If BCDC considers that it is acquiring a set
of benefits rather than preventing harm, then the purchase price
should approximate the fair market value. However, the fair market
value is difficult to estimate in an area where there are few
comparative sales or sites. Determination of the value of development
rights or conservation easements is an even more subjective procedure, and most likely will leave several dissatisfied parties. While
acquisition fails to minimize public investment, it does offer a range
of investment costs. Acquisition of fee interests would have cost
approximately $28.5 million at $500 per acre and $285 million at
$5,000 per acre in 1967.26 Purchase of less-than-fee interests will not
22. While the legal consultant to BCDC recommended taking the legality of ownership and
development to courts, the BCDC staff rejected the suggestion.
23. J. Reps, Requiem for Zoning, Proceedings, Annual Conference of American Society of
Planning Officials (1964).
24. D. Nandelher, ControllingLand Values in Areas of Rapid Urban Expansion, 12 U.C.L.A.
Rev. 734, 739 (1965).
25. Kranowecki & Paul, Preservation of Open Space in Metropolitan Areas, 110 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 179 (1961).
26. BCDC, supra, note 19, at Supplement, 464 (1969).
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significantly minimize costs, because most private owners are aware
of the value of their development rights. BCDC might reduce
purchase costs by offering private owners only their investment value
which is the sum of the initial costs, taxes and interest costs for the
period of ownership, or by zoning areas non-developmental on the
basis of preventing harm (air or water pollution, congestion, etc.), and
then purchasing the lands on the basis of their reduced value. An
overall assessment of acquisition controls indicates that they would
eliminate rental incentives for development, but would involve
considerable controversy over the equity of acquisition and the large
public investment.
Taxation control is the third major set of strategies for eliminating
rental incentives. 2 7 Taxation, as it applies to controlling private
property owners, is some form of development charge. 2 8 A development tax would be a charge for the privilege of converting wetlands
into fastlands, and it should equal the increment in rent attributable
to a change in land use. One option is a value added tax which could
exactly capture the increase in rent as measured by the value before
and after fill. The other option is a fill fee which would value the
amount per acre filled or the cubic yards of fill. Either option could be
used as a revenue source for compensating wetland owners who are
not permitted to fill in the bay.
Taxation control scores fairly well on two of the three criteria.
First, taxation could eliminate all the rental incentive by transferring
potential income transfers to the state. Second, the development
charge is an attractive strategy from the point of view of public
investment. Not only does it not require any capital outlay, but also it
generates revenue for state acquisition of wetlands. However, taxation
is questionable on equity grounds, because the state is discriminating,
particularly with the value added tax, against a particular set of
property owners. The courts would have to rule on the legitimacy of a
development charge. The outstanding effectiveness and cost minimization features of a development charge strongly recommend that
BCDC test its equity in the courts.
27. There also exists a category of taxation techniques for delaying development rather than
eliminating rental incentives; these techniques deserve mention. One procedure is to assess all
wetland property at lower value uses rather than in "its highest and best use" or fair market
value as long as it remains wetlands. As now practiced in California with golf courses, this
treatment is a windfall to an owner holding land for development and only shifts the burden of
taxes to other property owners. More importantly, it fails because it is no permanent guarantee
of open space. Stringent regulations are needed to insure just compensation for the public. A
more equitable option is tax deferral where taxes are paid on present use rather than fair market
value until the time of conversion when all fair market value taxes for all years are owed on the
property.
28. BCDC, supra note 19, at Powers, 69-70 (1968).
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The fourth set of controls is transfer payments, and it applies to
communities rather than private property owners. Communities
receive by converting wetlands into industrial and commercial
acreage rental gains in the form of net tax revenues, and any
successful modification of community behavior must eliminate that
development incentive. One option for eliminating the rental income
to cities is to shift the tax jurisdiction over all wetlands from
communities to a regional organization. The regional organization
would collect the taxes, redistribute monies to communities to pay for
services provided, and possibly allocate the remainder for wetland
acquisition. The region rather than any one city would receive the
rental gain from development. Another option is in-lieu payments to
communities if they forego development. They would receive compensation for the foregone rental income. A more comprehensive
option would be the elimination of property taxes as a major source of
community income and replacement of them by state income taxes.
Evaluation of transfer payments indicates they are very satisfactory, based on a simplistic view of community behavior. They
eliminate rental incentives either by sharing the rental gain or by
compensating for the rental loss. 29 Second, redistribution of rental
gains is equitable: (1) if the redistributive mechanism applies to all
communities, and (2) if it maintains a regional asset, the quality of the
bay. In-lieu payments are certainly fair to communities in that they
are compensated for any loss. Third, redistribution payments are a
gain in revenue for the state, and in-lieu payments would require
reimbursement only for a loss in net rather than gross revenue. If the
concept of transfer payments is satisfactory both to local and state
governments, it should eliminate the rental incentive for community
expansion.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the level of community dissatisfaction with past
decisions, the market-local government mechanism did not efficiently
allocate wetlands in San Francisco Bay. California responded to the
issue by creating the San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission, which determined broad guidelines for efficient
allocation. The permanent authorization of BCDC as a state agency
was heralded as sufficient for preserving the quality of San Francisco
29. The efficacy of the technique is based on the questionable assumption that revenue gain
is the only motivation for community expansion. While revenue sharing would redistribute the
rental gain and in-lieu payments would free a community from viewing wetland conversion as a
source of revenue, their success probably cannot modify the other incentives motivating
community expansion. However, they do eliminate a predominant motive for community
growth.
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Bay. However, successful implementation of the BCDC master plan
or guidelines requires fulfillment of several conditions. While the
legislature provided BCDC with one necessary condition, regulatory
power, it did not establish another necessary condition, a mechanism
for insuring long run public support for BCDC. This paper argues that
institutional devices which deal with parties adversely affected by
BCDC regulatory powers are necessary to insure sustained public
support. It identifies those parties adversely affected and evaluates
several techniques which might sustain the support of interest groups.
The two parties which are most economically disadvantaged by
BCDC decisions are private property owners and local communities.
Private property owners lose rental gains, and communities lose tax
revenue depending upon the configuration of new development.
Three categories of intervention strategies deal with the rental
income of private property owners. Only one category addresses itself
to community gain. On the basis of effectiveness, equity and
efficiency, specific legal and taxation techniques minimize public
expense while promising a high degree of effectiveness and equity.
The use of transfer payments is the best technique for nulifying
community proclivity for development.

